T—and that heiaven and earth, plants and animals^ were framed by them both; that is, by mind as the principal and directive caiise, but by bature as a subservient or executive instrument; and else* where joining in like manner God and nature both together, as when he concludes, That God and nature do nothing in vain.

Neither was Aristotle the first broacher or inventor of this doctrine, Plato before him having plainly asserted the same. For in a passage already cited, he affirms, that nature, together with reason, and according to it, orders all" things; thereby making nature, as a distinct thing from the Deity, to be a subordinate cause tinder the reason and wisdom of it. tAnd elsewhere he resolves, that there are *e^povog fyvcrzwq airiai,* cue *vwnpe* *rovcraiQ o Oeo$* xp^rat, certain causes of a wise and artificial nature, which the Deity uses as subservient to itself;—as also, that there are 2-waina olc £w£pyotc 0eoc *xpyrai,* con-causes, which God makes use of, as subordinately co-operative with himself.

Moreover, before Plato, Empedocles philosophized also in the same manner, when, supposing two worlds, the one archetypal, the other ectypal, he made *<t>i|ia* and va/coc, friendship and discord, to be the *apyrj* Spao-riyjoioc, the active principle and immediate operator in this lower world; he not understanding thereby, as Plutarch[a] aiid some others have conceited, two substantial principles in the world, the one of good, the other of evil; but only a plastic nature, as Aristotle in sundry

• * De Iside et Osiride, p. 370. touui. oper.